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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 192 54
DENNIS A. HEAPS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant; Dennis A. Heaps, was charged with Possession
of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-10-503 (1978).

Defendant was on parole from the Utah State Prison for the crime
of burglary.
Defendant waived the jury and was convicted of
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person in a
trial held April 25, 1983, in the Third Judicial District Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest
F. Baldwin, Judge, presiding.

Defendant was sentenced on May 4,

1983, by Judge Baldwin, to serve an indeterminate term of

1 to

15 years in the Utah State Prison, to run concurrently with the
term already being served by defendant for the prior burglary
conviction.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the afternoon of Sunday, January 23, 1983, Brian
Hargett cleaned his .380 automatic pistol and replaced the gun

and its holster between the mattress and bed frame at the foot
his waterbed in his bedroom CR. 63-64, 781.

of

The bed covers were

pulled away, exposing the handle of the gun CR. 781.
At approximately 11:00 p.m. on January 23, 1983,
defendant, Doug Jensen and Gabe Gallegos visited Hargett's
apartment to watch videos CR. 64-66, 72, 153-155, 165-166>.
Defendant had met Hargett only a day or two earlier at a small
party in defendant's apartment just down the hall from Hargett's

CR. 69-70, 93, 153, 189-1901.

During the course of their visit,

each of the three visitors used Hargett's bathroom, going through
Hargett's bedroom to get there CR. 66-67, 73-74).

Defendant and

the other two visitors left Hargett's apartment at approximately
12:30 a.m. CR. 67, 74, 166).

The following Wednesday, after

learning that defendant had been arrested for possession of

a

firearm, Hargett looked for his gun between the mattress and bed
frame and discovered that the gun was missing CR. 67-68, 75-77).
Hargett testified that to his knowledge no one knew he kept a gun
in his bedroom CR. 70-71, 79).
On the evening of Tuesday, January, 25, 1983, at
approximately 9:00 o'clock, defendant asked his friend David
McCoy to drive him and his girlfriend, LaDawn Turner, to his
girlfriend's house by way of North Temple CR. 82, 159, 201-202).
Defendant, Turner, McCoy and McCoy's 3-year-old daughter were in
the cab of McCoy's 1979 Ford pickup truck driving along North
Temple when defendant pulled a gun from his waistline and showed
it to McCoy CR. 84-85, 94, 1991.

McCoy asked defendant to put

the gun back, and defendant did so CR. 85).
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At defendant's request, McCoy pulled into the parking
Jut

of Grinders 13, a restaurant located between 1100 and 1200

,,;psi:

on North Temple CR. 83, 93, 160, 201).

Defendant exited the

ui•kup truck and, while the others waited in the cab, walked next
~uor

liuuse

to the Lake Hills Community Correction Center, a halfway
for convicts, ostensibly to pick up from his friend Mike

Periy a magazine and a pair of sunglasses that defendant had left
at the halfway house when he had been released therefrom in
December of 1982 CR. 85, 93, 128, 159-160, 174-175).

Defendant

returned to McCoy's pickup truck, followed by Perry, and both got
into the cab CR. 85, 94, 130, 160, 173).

McCoy was sitting

behind the steering wheel with his daughter seated immediately to
his right, while on the other side of the gearshift sat Turner,
dclendant and Perry, in that order IR. 86, 96-97).
After Perry got in the cab of the pickup truck, McCoy
drove out of the Grinders 13 parking lot, angling west across
North Temple CR. 85, 94, 108, 115, 131-132, 160-161, 172-173).
McCoy pulled into the VIP Trailer Court and came to a stop when
Officer Henry Huish of the Salt Lake City Police Department
pulled in behind the pickup truck with his patrol car's overhead
rack lights flashing CR. 86, 94, 108, 115, 133, 162, 181).
Officer Huish had been observing the pickup truck and its
occupants for several minutes from his parked patrol car after
having noticed the pickup truck during two passes of the Grinders
13 parking lot, and decided to stop the pickup truck when McCoy

illegally changed lanes while angling across North Temple CR.
106-10 8 , 115) •
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As backup units arrived, Officer Huish ordered the
occupants out of the cab of the pickup truck.

Dave McCoy, his

daughter, LaDawn Turner, defendant and Mike Perry, in that order,
then existed the pickup truck from the driver's side CR. 86, 9596, 109, 121, 134-135).

The officers then searched the occupants

for firearms, and Officer Huish searched the pickup truck cab,
finding the loaded .380 automatic under the seat approximately 12
to 18 inches away from the passenger door, directly below where
defendant had been sitting CR. 96, 109-11, 114-115, 121).
Concerned because of the discovery of the gun, the officers, for
their own safety, handcuffed but did not place under arrest the
occupants of the pickup truck CR. 117-120).
Office Huish interviewed each of the occupants
separately regarding possession of the gun, and each initially
denied any knowledge of the gun; however, upon a second interview
both McCoy and Perry informed Officer Huish that defendant had
been in possession of the gun, keeping it tucked in his waistband
CR. 95-98, 112-114, 116-118, 181-187).

Defendant was placed

under arrest and questioned again regarding possession of the
gun.

Defendant again denied any knowledge of the gun, but then

asked if it was a .380 automatic.

Officer Huish responded

affirmatively, and defendant volunteered that the gun belonged to
someone named Brian, who had probably left it in the truck CR.
114, 162-163, 173).

Because defendant at that time was on parole from the
Utah State Prison for a previous burglary conviction CR. 53-54,
151-152), he was charged with Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by
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a Restricted Person.

Defendant now appeals his conviction on

that charge.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Point I.
3

Defendant cannot raise for the first time on

ppeal a claim that excluded testimony should have been admitted

at trial under the prior inconsistent statement exception to the
hearsay rule because defendant failed to so inform the trial
court.

This Court will not review claims in such circumstances

because the trial court was not afforded the opportunity of
addressing defendant's concerns, failure to raise the claim at
trial indicates acquiesence in the trial court's ruling, and the
granting of a new trial in such circumstances would contravene
considerations of finality.
Defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its
discretion by excluding hearsay testimony proposed by defendant
or that he was unfairly prejudiced thereby.

The trial court

properly excluded the hearsay testimony because the testimony was
no so inherently reliable that it could be admitted under an
exception to the hearsay rule and because defendant did not
provide the hearsay declarant an opportunity to deny or explain
the alleged statement.

Finally, in light of the overwhelming

evidence of defendant's guilt, any error in the exclusion of the
testimony was harmless.
Point II.

Defendant waived any challenge to the

admissibility of the gun by failing to make a pre-trial motion to
suppress such evidence in accordance with Rule 12, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and his interposing an objection at trial at
-5-

the end of the State's case-in-chief does not preserve the issue
for appeal.

Defendant has shown no cause warranting relief from

Rule 12's waiver provision, and the waiver should be enforced
because defendant long before the first day of trial was aware of
the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest and of the
possibility of the introduction into evidence of the gun.
Because defendant failed to discharge his burden of
proof with respect to the alleged inadmissibility of the gun, the
record does not reveal the extent of the police officer's
probable cause for the stop, search and arrest; therefore, this
Court has no basis upon which to review defendant's allegation of
irregularities in the stop, search or arrest.

Defendant should

not be permitted to challenge on appeal issues he failed to
develop adequately at trial.
Finally, under Rakas

y,

Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99

s.ct. 421, 58 L.Ed. 2d 387 (1978), defendant has no standing to
challenge the search of the passenger compartment of David
McCoy's pickup truck because as a mere passenger he had no
legitimate expectation of privacy therein.
Point III.
sufficient evidence.

Defendant's conviction is supported by
The testimony of David McCoy and Officer

Henry Huish, the police report and other circumstantial evidence
all established that the gun was in defendant's possession.
MGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE HEARSAY
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S WITNESS.

-6-

A.

DEFENDANT CANNOT CHALLENGE ON APPEAL THE
TRIAL COURT'S RULING

Defendant at trial sought to elicit from defense
witness, Mike Perry, on direct examination the substance of a
ctatement allegedly made by David McCoy at the VIP Trailer Court
:J·"t

after they had been released.

The trial court sustained the

prosecutor's objections to this hearsay testimony because the
testimony was intended only to establish the truth or falsity of
McCoy's alleged statement (R. 103, 140-146)

[~Appendix

"A"l.

Defendant did not object to the trial court's ruling.
Defendant on appeal alleges as error the trial court's
exclusion of Perry's testimony and now claims for the first time
that the testimony should have been allowed as a prior
inconsistent statement, an exception to the hearsay rule.
63(1) (al, Utah Rules of Evidence

(1977).

Rule

(The new Utah Rules of

Evidence did not become effective until September 1, 1983, after
defendant's trial was completed.)

Defendant in his brief

speculates that in the absence of the trial court's rulings Perry
would have impeached McCoy by testifying that McCoy told him that
the gun was not in defendant's possession but was in fact in
McCoy's possession (Brief of Appellant, p. 7).
Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence, provided that a party
may challenge on appeal the exclusion of evidence only if the

record shows that the party made known the substance of the
evidence or indicated the substance of the anticipated evidence
by questions indicating the desired testimony.

In the instant

case the substance of the excluded testimony was adequately
indicated by the questions asked; however, this

-7-

Court in

Bradford y. Alvey & Soos, Utah, 621 P.2d 1240 (1980), expanded
the requirements of Rule 5 by affirming the trial court's
exclusion of hearsay testimony on the grounds that at trial the
plaintiff-appellant "did not make any offer of proof as to what
evidence would be adduced, nor the purpose it would serve, as
required by Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence."

.l.d. at 1243

(emphasis added).
Io the case at bar, the trial court repeatedly asked
defendant the purpose of the desired testimony and indicated that
the testimony would be admissible if the reason for the questions
was other than to establish the truth or falsity of McCoy's
alleged statement (R. 141-142) [£e.e. Appendix "A"l.

Defendant

never advised the trial court that he was offering the testimony
as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach McCoy.

For

defendant now to challenge the trial court's ruling on that basis
violates the well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that absent
exceptional circumstances a party cannot raise an issue for the
first time on appeal.

State y. Steggell, Utah, 660 P.2d 252

(1983); Wagner y. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971).
Since defendant has not alleged any exceptional circumstances
justifying his failure to take advantage of the ample
opportunities presented at trial to raise this claim, he is
precluded from challenging the trial court's ruling.
This Court's language in Bradford, indicating that a
party cannot challenge on appeal the trial court's exclusion of
testimony unless that party informed the trial court of the
purpose to be served by the testimony, is supported by Rule 20,
-8-

utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Utah Code Ann.

§

77-35-20

(1982)), which provides:
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the
court are unnecessary. It is sufficient that
a party state his objections to the actions
of the court and the reasons therefore.
If a party has no opportunity to object to
a ruling or order, the absence of an
objection shall not therefore prejudice him.
Thus, although Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence, did not expressly
require a contemporaneous objection to a trial court's ruling
excluding testimony as did Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence (1977),
in cases involving the admission of evidence, under Rule 20, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and this Court's ruling in Bradford,
a party has a duty at trial to raise the legal grounds supporting
the admissibility of excluded testimony and to inform the court
of the purpose to be served by the excluded testimony.
The application of Rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to this case is clear.

Because defendant had ample

opportunity to object to the trial court's exclusion of Mike
Perry's hearsay testimony on the grounds that the testimony was
admissible as a prior inconsistent statement offered for the
purpose of impeaching David McCoy, defendant's failure to do so
precludes him from now raising the issue on appeal.
This result is supported by solid policy
considerations.

The court in Rice y. State, 567 P.2d 525 <okl.

Cr. 1977), outlined several important reasons for such a rule.
In .Ri..c..e, the prosecutor objected to testimony which the defendant
sought to elicit on direct examination from her own witnesses.
The .Ri..c..e court stated:
-9-

The court, rightfully or wrongfully,
sustained the State's motion.
Defendant thereupon took no exception
to the court's ruling. An exception
here would have been no mere formality
for by not taking it defendant
apparently acquiesced in the court's
ruling. Had an exception been taken
argument could have been had with the
chance of changing the court's mind.
Since the exception was not taken,
the trial court was denied an
opportunity to correct itself.
A prosecutor's objection to evidence
introduced by the defendant does not
preserve the record for defendant when
the court rules adversely to defendant •

.I..d. at 530. 1
These considerations are similar to those supporting
the contemporaneous objection rule applied to cases in which the
admission of evidence is challenged on appeal.

This Court

recently in State y. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942 (1982),
endorsed the following statement of the Kansas Supreme Court in
State y. Moore, 218 Kan. 450, 543 P.2d 923, 927 11975):
The contemporaneous objection rule long
adhered to in this state requires timely
and specific objection to admission of
evidence in order for the question of
admissibility to be considered on appeal.
The rule is a statutory procedural tool
serving a legitimate state purpose. By
making use of the rule, counsel gives the
trial court the opportunity to conduct the
trial without using the tainted evidence,
and thus avoid possible reversal and a
1 Under Rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a party woulld
object rather than take exception to a trial court's ruling. In
light of Rule 20's objection requirement, the elimination of any
requirement to except to a trial court's rulings is obviously
intended to eliminate superfluous exceptions when a timely and
specific objection has already been interposed and~not to relieve
a party of the duty to raise his or her concerns for the trial
court's consideration.
-10-

new trial. Furthermore, the rule is
practically one of necessity if litigation
is ever to be brought to an end.
fu;_Gardell, 652 P.2d at 947.

After noting that defendant

Mccardell failed to make a specific objection to the admission of
the challenged evidence, this Court further stated:

This is clearly a case where a timely and
specific objection would have afforded
the trial court the opportunity to
address McCardell's concerns and at the
same time permit the State to proceed
with the evidence most relevant to its
case. A new trial should not be the
result of McCardell's failure to provide
the trial court that opportunity.
Id.

The considerations outlined by the

~

Court in Mccardell apply to the instant case.

court and this

By failing to

raise this claim at trial, defendant apparently acquiesced in the
trial court's exclusion of the testimony.

The prosecutor's

objection should not preserve the issue for defendant because the
prosecutor's position is at odds with defendant's position and
the prosecutor's objection did not provide the trial court with
the opportunity to address defendant's concerns.

Defendant's

failure to provide the trial court with such an opportunity
should not result in a new trial at the expense of finality
considerations and the conservation of already extended judicial
resources.

Also, the opportunity to conduct a trial using all

admissible evidence is just as important as the opportunity to
conduct a trial without using tainted evidence.

Finally, all of

these considerations are in harmony with the previously cited
rule that a party cannot raise an issue for the first time on
appeal.
-ll-

Therefore, in compliance with Rule 20, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and this Court's ruling in Bradford y, AlveJ'
~.

Utah, 621 P.2d 1240 (1980), defendant is precluded from

now challenging the exclusion of Mike Perry's hearsay testimony
because he neither objected to the trial court's ruling stating
the grounds therefor nor informed the trial court of any
permissible purpose of the excluded testimony.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY EXCLUDIN:i THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY

This Court has consistently held that the trial court's
rulings on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed
unless there is a clear showing that the judge abused his
discretion and that a party has been unfairly prejudiced.
Interest of
~.

.ln

s---J---, Utah, 576 P.2d 1280 (1978): In re Baxter's

16 Utah 2d 284, 399 P.2d 442 (1965):

Carlson, Utah, 635 P.2d 72 (1982)

~

.al.s.Q State y.

("clear showing" requirement).

Moreover, when, as here, the trial is to the court,
review of the trial court's rulings on the admissibility of
evidence is less strict because the trial judge has superior
knowledge as to the competency and effect that should be given
evidence and will include this knowledge and judgment in his
consideration of the admissibility of the evidence.

Del Porto y.

~.

27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972l: In re Baxter's

~'

399 P.2d at 445,
Defendant has made no clear showing that the trial

court abused its discretion by excluding Mike Perry's hearsay
testimony or that defendant was unfairly prejudiced thereby.
Since, as discussed above, defendant failed to inform the trial
-12-

since, as discussed above, defendant failed to inform the trial
court that the purpose of the excluded testimony was to impeach
navid McCoy by means of a prior inconsistent statement the trial
,_,,ur t' s failure to admit the testimony on this basis cannot be an

"buse of discretion.
bj'

Also, defendant was not unfairly prejudiced

the exclusion of the testimony because, as discussed below,

any error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of
defendant's guilt.
C.

THE TESTIJIDNY WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER AN
EXCEPI'ION TO THE HEARSAY RULE BECAUSE IT
LACKED THE INDICIA OF RELIABILITY.

Hearsay testimony generally is excluded because the
credibility of testimony is best tested when the witness
testifies under oath in open court and is subject to crossexamination.

State y. Sanders, 27 Utah 2d 354, 496 P.2d 270

11972); People y, Dement, 661 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1983); McCormick on
Evidence,

§

245 (2d ed. 1972).

However, testimony that is otherwise hearsay may be
admitted into evidence if it falls under an exception having
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, and absent such
guarantees, the testimony is inadmissible.

State y. Martin, 686

P.2d 937, 949 (N.M. 1984); State y. Robinson, 94 N.M. 693, 616
P.2d 404 (1980); People y. Howard, 198 Colo. 317, 599 P.2d 899
11979);

tl.a_

Rule 803 ( 24), Utah Rules of Evidence (Supp. 1983)

(Hearsay statements are covered by this "catchall" exception only
if they have "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"

-13-

equivalent to those of the other exceptions.) .2
court stated unequivocally:

The Robinson

"Guarantees of reliability are and

must be the key to open the door to the exceptions."
411.

616 P.2d at

The court in .limi.ALd equally emphatically stated:

"The

trier of fact will only be permitted to receive hearsay testimony
as evidence only in those limited circumstances where the
inherent reliability of the hearsay clearly outweighs the
policy reasons for excluding it."

599 P.2d at 899.

exceptions dealt with in both Robinson and

stro~

The

~were,

as here,

established statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule.
In the instant case, Mike Perry's hearsay testimony
could not have been admitted under an exception to the hearsay
rule because it lacked the indicia of reliability.

The court in

Stanberry y. State, 637 P.2d 892 COkl. Cr. 1981), outlined
several factors to be considered in determining the reliability
of a hearsay statement:
The trustworthiness of a statement should be
analyzed by evaluating the facts corroborating
the veracity of the statement, the circumstances
in which the declarant made the statement, and
the incentive he or she had to speak truthfully
or falsely; and careful consideration should
be given to factors bearing on the reliability
of the reporting of the hearsay by the witness.

2 The new Utah Rules of Evidence, though not in effect at the
time of defendant's trial, reflect this Court's acknowledgement
of the fact that exceptions to the hearsay rule depend on
circumstantial guarantees of reliability that substitute for the
oath and cross-examination. Although under the new rules a prior
inconsistent statement is not hearsay, under the prior rules
governing this proceeding, such a statement was admissible only
a~ an exception to the hearsay rule and as such must have
circumstantial guarantees of reliability.
-14-

_Ll.

at 895, citing United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3rd

cir. 1978).

Although the Stanberry court considered the

,elidbility of a hearsay statement in the context of the residual
•xception to the hearsay rule, its test is equally applicable to
the

present situation.
The defendant's questions of Mike Perry were clearly

intended to elicit from Mike Perry testimony regarding an alleged
statement by David McCoy to the effect that the gun was not in
defendant's possession.

The alleged statement fails the first

test of reliability as set out by the Stanberry court:

the

alleged statement's veracity is not corroborated by other
evidence.

In fact, as noted below in the harmless error

discussion, all of the evidence contradicts the substance of the
alleged statement.

The alleged statement also fails the

Stanberry court's last test because the reliability of Mike
Perry's reporting of the alleged statement was eroded by Officer
Huish's testimony that Perry had informed him at the scene of the
arrest that the gun was in defendant's possession and that he,
Officer Huish, had so recorded the incident in his official
report (R. 117, 181-187) ,3
Finally, the hearsay testimony need not have been
admitted merely because the alleged declarant was available for
cross-examination.

Beavers y. State, 492 P.2d 88 (Alaska 1971).

The Beavers court reasoned:
3

The other Stanberry tests apply to cases in which the
trustworthiness of the declarant is suspect and so do not apply
to the case at bar.
-15-

if the person to whom the statement
is attributed is indeed present at the
hearing and can testify, that person
himself should testify to the facts
contained in the statement which the
first witness would have attributed
to him. If he does, there is nothing
lost to the party who sought to introduce
that testimony as hearsay. However, if
he does not, or will not, then an
unproductive swearing contest, in which
witnesses are attributing statements to
each other, is avoided.
~.

at 96.
McCormick, in support of the admissibility of

inconsistent statements of a witness, noted:

"It is hard to

escape the view that evidence of a previous inconsistent
statement, when declarant is on the stand to explain it if he
can, has in high degree the safeguards of examined testimony."
McCormick on Evidence,

§

251 (2d ed. 1972).

In the present case,

although David McCoy was on the stand, defendant never questioned
McCoy regarding the alleged statement during his initial crossexamination of McCoy in the prosecution's case-in-chief or during
his re-cross-examination of McCoy when McCoy was recalled as a
rebuttal witness.

Thus, defendant failed to provide McCoy an

opportunity to deny, admit or explain the alleged statement,
thereby eliminating the increased safeguards noted by McCormick.
Therefore, defendant's belated claim that Perry's
testimony should have been admitted under the prior inconsistent
statement exception to the hearsay rule is without merit because
the testimony lacked the indicia of reliability, and the fact
that McCoy was available to testify does not increase the
reliability of the hearsay testimony because defendant gave McCoy
no opportunity to explain the alleged statement.
-16-

D.

ANY ERROR IN THE EXCLUSION OF THE HEARSAY
TESTIMONY WAS HARMLESS

Rule 5, Utah Rules of Evidence, provided that the
exclusion of evidence shall not result in a reversal of a
, 011

v ict ion unless the proponent of the evidence makes an adequate

offer of proof and the reviewing court determines that "the
excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence
in bringing about a different verdict or finding."

Rule 61, Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, also provides:
No error in either the admission or
the exclusion of evidence, and no error
in any ruling or order or in anything
done or omitted by the court or by any
of the parties, is ground for granting
a new trial or otherwise disturbing
a judgment or order, unless refusal to
take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice.
The court at every stage of the proceeding
must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.
This Court in State y. Urias, Utah, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329
11980), further stated:
The mandate of our statute, and
the policy firmly established in our
decisional law, is that we do not upset
the verdict of a jury merely because
some error or irregularity may have
occurred, but will do so only if it
is something substantial and prejudicial
in the sense that there is a reasonable
likelihood that in its absence there
would have been a different result.
(Emphasis added.)

Because of the overwhelming evidence of

defendant's guilt and because Mike Perry's credibility was
impeached by Officer Huish's testimony, there is no reasonable
likelihood that the admission of Perry's hearsay testimony would
have resulted in defendant's acquittal.
-17-

All of the evidence pointed to the fact that the gun
was in defendant's possession.

Officer Huish testified, and the

police report confirmed, that both David McCoy and Mike Perry
informed him that defendant was in possession of the gun CR. 117118, 181-187).

David McCoy also testified that the gun was in

defendant's possession (R. 84-88, 94-98, 198-200).

Of those

present in the cab of McCoy's pickup truck on the night of
Tuesday, January 25, 1983, only defendant had been in Brian
Hargett's bedroom between the time Hargett had cleaned and
replaced the gun between the mattress and footboard of his bed on
Sunday afternoon, January 23, 1983, and the time Hargett
discovered that the gun was missing on Wednesday, January 26,
1983 (R. 63-68, 72-77, 80, 85-86, 129-130, 191, 194).

Finally,

Officer Huish found the gun under the seat directly below where
defendant had been sitting, 12" to 18" from the passenger door
CR. 86, 96-97, 109-111, 121, 134-135).

Thus, even if Perry's

hearsay testimony had been allowed and had damaged the
credibility of McCoy's testimony, the remaining evidence was more
than sufficient to warrant the trial court's finding defendant
guilty.
However, because Officer Huish impeached Perry's
credibility, there is no reasonable likelihood that the trial
court would have believed Perry's testimony at the expense of
McCoy's testimony.

At trial, Perry denied having told the

officer that the gun was in defendant's possession (R. 149-150),
but Officer Huish testified that Perry had told him that
defendant was in possession of the gun and the police report
recorded that fact (R. 117, 181-187).
-18-

Therefore, any error in the trial court's exclusion of
the hearsay testimony was harmless, and the conviction should be
. {f 1

rmed.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE GUN
INTO EVIDENCE.
A.

DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CHALLENGE TO THE
ADMISSION OF THE GUN INTO EVIDENCE BY
FAILING TO FILE A PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO
SUPPRESS.

Rule 12 (bl, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, (Utah
Code

Ann.

§

77-35-12)

<1982)), provides:

Any defense, objection or request,
including request for rulings on the
admissibility of the evidence, which
is capable of determination without the
trial of the general issue may be raised
prior to trial by written motion.
The following shall be raised at least
five days prior to the trial:
(2) Motions concerning the
admissibility of evidence.
!Emphasis added.)

Subsection Cdl of Rule 12 further provides:

Failure of the defendant to timely
raise defenses or objections or to make
requests which must be made prior to trial
or at the time set by the court .sh.all
constitute waiver thereof, but the court
for cause shown may grant relief from
such waiver.
!Emphasis added.)
Defendant failed to make a pre-trial motion to suppress
the gun found by Officer Huish in his search of David McCoy's
pickup truck on the evening of Tuesday, January 25, 1983.
Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 12, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant's failure to so object to

-19-

the gun before trial constituted a waiver of his objection.
Furthermore, defendant has not sought relief from such waiver and
has shown no cause warranting this Court's granting of such
relief.

Indeed, defendant could not show sufficient cause to

warrant the granting of relief.

Defendant knew that the gun had

been seized and the circumstances surrounding that seizure and
had ample opportunity before trial to voice any objection to the
admissibility of the gun in accordance with the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
This Court recently in State y. John, Utah, 667 P.2d 32
(1983), held that under Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendant's failure to timely object to the
victim's identification constituted a waiver of the objection.
The Court stated:

"It is held generally that where there is a

claim of irregularity in obtaining evidence, such claim should be
asserted before trial, or at the least, at the trial at the first
opportunity.•

.l_d.

at 33.

The Court supported this rule by

quoting from Nardone y. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct.
266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939), to the effect that auxiliary inquiries
should not be allowed to disrupt the course of the trial.
In the instant case, defendant neither asserted his
challenge to the constitutionality of the search that resulted in
the seizure of the gun before trial not asserted such claim at
the first opportunity at trial.

Defendant waited until the

prosecution finished its case-in-chief to object in conclusory
terms to the admission of the gun.

By that time, Brian Hargett

had identified the gun as his and had testified that after
-20-

defendant had been in his bedroom he discovered the gun missing;
oavid McCoy had identified the gun as the one defendant had in
his possession while riding in the cab of McCoy's pickup truck on
the evening of January 25, 1983; and Officer Huish had already
1dentif ied the gun as the one he found under the seat in the cab
c.l

McCoy's pickup truck directly below where defendant had been

sitting.

This cannot constitute the raising of the claim at the

first opportunity at trial since it contravenes the purpose of
requiring early objection to alleged irregularities in the
obtaining of evidence as outlined in Nardone; to wit, defendants
must raise timely challenges to obtaining of evidence in order to
avoid the disruption of the course of the trial.
Although the defendant in J.Qhn also failed to interpose
a timely objection as required by the "contemporaneous objection"
rule, that ground for the Court's ruling was separate and
independent from the Rule 12(d) waiver ground.

The Rule 12(d)

waiver provision alone is sufficient to warrant this Court's
refusal to review an allegation of error on appeal.

J:!.il.lil, Utah, 674 P.2d 130 (1983)

~

State y.

(Rule 12(d) waiver alone

precluded review of allegation of error regarding trial court's
failure to inquire of the jurors if they would be prejudiced
because the case involved motorcycle clubs).
Other courts have also ruled under similar statutory
schemes that the defendant's failure to make a pre-trial motion
to suppress waives the issue even if the defendant subsequently
OhJects at trial to the admission of the evidence.
Supreme Court has stated the rule as follows:
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The Montana

One wishing to preclude the use of evidence
obtained through a violation of his
constitutional rights must protect himself
by timely action. If he has had opportunity
to suppress the evidence before trial and
has failed to take advantage of his remedy,
objection to the evidence upon trial will
not avail him.
State y. Briner, 567 P.2d 35, 37-38 (Mont. 1977), quoting .s..tat..e.
y. Gotta, 71 Mont. 288, 290, 229 P. 405, 406

(1924).

The Montana

Supreme Court in D.I.i..ne.I held that the defendant's failure to file
a pre-trial motion to suppress was not excused by good cause
because the defendant, like the defendant in the instant case,
was aware of the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest
and the possibility of the introduction of certain evidence long
before the first day of trial.
The Supreme Court of Arizona in State y. Marahrnes, 114
Ariz. 304, 560 P.2d 1211 (1977)

(En Banc), refused to reach the

merits of the defendant's challenge to the admissibility of
certain evidence because the defendant had waived the issue by
failing to make a pre-trial motion to suppress even though the
defendant raised the objection at trial and his co-defendant
filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the same evidence.
Therefore, in compliance with the provisions of Rule
12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and this Court's rulings in
.J..Qhn and .M.ilJ...e.r, defendant's failure to challenge the

admissibility of the gun in a pre-trial motion to suppress waives
the objection, precluding the Court's reaching the merits of
defendant's allegation of error on appeal, despite defendant's
objection at trial.
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B.

DEFENDANT FAILED TO DISCHARGE HIS BURDEN
OF PROOF REGARDING THE ALLEGED INADMISSIBILITY
OF THE GUN.

Rule 12(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Utah Code
Ann.

§

77-35-12 (1982), provides that in a motion to suppress

~vidence

upon grounds of unlawful search and seizure, the

defendant or applicant has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that a substantial violation has
occurred.

Once the defendant or applicant has established by a

preponderance of the evidence that the search and seizure was
unlawful, only then does the peace officer have the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was acting in
good faith.
This Court's rulings are to the same effect as Rule
12 (g)

:

Evidence is suppressed or excluded only if
the same was obtained by a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, designed to protect a
person's right to privacy and property.
Evidence sought to be excluded is
admissible, however, until the accused
has established that his rights under
the rule have been invaded.
State y. Sessions, Utah, 583 P.2d 44 (1978), quoting State y,
Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P.2d 958,

~. ~.

939, 87 s.ct. 305, 17 L.Ed. 2d 218 (1966)

385 U.S.

<emphasis added).

The burden is properly on the defendant or applicant
because the burden should be on the moving party, there is a
presumption of regula.rity attending the actions of law
enforcement officials, relevant evidence is generally admissible
and exceptions must be justified by the party claiming the
exception, and this burden will deter spurious allegations that
-23-

are wasteful of court time.

Lafave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,

§

11.2

(1978), and cases cited therein.
Defendant did not discharge his burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the gun was obtained by a
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.

To the contrary, defendant at trial was in effect

"sandbagging," waiting to challenge on appeal issues he failed to
develop fully at trial.

As noted above, defendant failed to file

a pre-trial motion to suppress the gun, in which defendant could
have raised facts, if any, tending to establish that the search
and seizure was unlawful and that a a substantial violation had
occurred.
Moreover, defendant also failed to pursue obvious lines
of questioning that would have elicited more information
regarding the existence or lack of probable cause on the part of
Officer Huish with respect to the stop, the search or the arrest.
For example, during defendant's cross-examination of Officer
Huish, the following exchange occurred:
Q. The reason you pulled the vehicle over
was because of the improper lane change or
the pulling out of the driveway without a
signal on?

A.
(R. 115).

That was one reason.

Defendant failed to follow up Officer Huish's response

with a question asking what other reasons he had for stopping
McCoy's pickup truck.

As a result, the record does not reveal

what more probable cause existed for the stop, search or arrest,
other than the above and David McCoy's speculation that Officer
Huish had received a "tip" that there was a gun in the truck (R.
98).
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Because under Utah law defendant has the burden of
establishing a substantial violation in a search and seizure
case, defendant's failure to develop a record upon which the
court could review the propriety of the search and seizure should
preclude his present claim, and in the absence of any evidence
that the search and seizure was unlawful and constituted a
substantial violation, the Court should presume that the trial
court properly admitted the evidence resulting therefrom.
C.

DEFENDANT HAS NO STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
SEARCH OF McCOY'S VEHICLE.

It is well settled that a defendant has no standing to
challenge the admissibility of evidence on the grounds of
unlawful search and seizure if he claims prejudice only through
the use of evidence gathered as a result of a search or seizure
directed at another person; rather, the defendant must have been
the victim of a search or seizure.

Jones

y,

United States, 362

u.s. 257, 80 s.ct. 725, 4 L.Ed. 2d 697 <1960).

In other words,

the fundamental inquiry regarding standing is whether the conduct
challenged by the defendant involved an intrusion into his
reasonable expectation of privacy.
364,

Mancusi y. DeForte, 392 U.S.

88 s.ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1154 Cl968l.
The United States Supreme Court in Rakas y. Illinois,

439

U.S. 128, 99 s.ct. 421, 58 L.Ed. 2d 387, .J.:.eh.

~.

439

u.s. 1122, 99 s.ct. 1035, 59 L.Ed. 2d 83 <1978), held that
passengers are without standing to object to the search of the
vehicle in which they are riding because they have no legitimate
expectation of privacy therein.
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In E.£.11..a.s., a police officer stopped what he believed was
a getaway car after receiving a radio report of a robbery.

After

the occupants were ordered out of the car, a search of the
interior revealed a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger
seat and a box of rifle shells in the glove compartment.

The

defendants admitted they owned neither the vehicle nor the rifle
and shells and that they were simply passengers in the vehicle.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, determined
that the defendants had no "legitimate expectation of privacy in
the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which
they were merely passengers.

Like the trunk of an automobile,

these are areas in which a passenger

~

passenger simply would

not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy."

.I.d. at

148-149.
In the instant case, defendant also owned neither the
vehicle in which he was merely a passenger nor the gun discovered
under the seat directly below where he was sitting.

Therefore,

defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
under the seat and thus cannot challenge the search of McCoy's
pickup truck.
Defendant seeks to distinguish E.£.11..a.s. by claiming that
the search was incident to an illegal arrest, a circumstance in
which he claims E.£.11..a.s. dictum preserves defendant's standing.
However, defendant does not cite to that portion of
allegedly supports his contention.

~

that

Furthermore, even if such

dictum exists, it is merely dictum and is not binding on this
Court.

Finally, as previously discussed, as a result of
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defendant's failure to discharge his burden of proof, the record
does not reveal whether the initial detention was supported by
arlequate probable cause.

Therefore, defendant fails in his

aLlempt to distinguish .E.'1..k..a..s. and thus under the terms of Ra.k..a..s
nas

no standing to challenge the search of McCoy's pickup truck.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION.
This Court has recently determined that the following

standard should be applied on challenges to the sufficiency of
evidence in jury trials:
This Court definitively laid down the
standard of review on challenges to the
sufficiency of evidence in State v. Petree,
Utah, 659 P.2d 443 (1983), in stating at
333:
[Wle review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to
the verdict of the jury. We reverse a
jury conviction for insufficient evidence
only when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted.
State y, Griffin, Utah, 685 P.2d 546, 547 (1984).

This standard

should apply with equal force to non-jury trials because when, as
here, the trial court is the finder of fact, it has the
prerogative to determine the substantiality of the evidence.
State y, Romero, Utah, 684 P.2d 643 (1984).

Defendant in his

brief acknowledges that the above is the appropriate standard of
review (Brief of Appellant, pp. 25-26).
Defendant was charged under Utah Code Ann. S 76-10501 ( 2), which provides in pertinent part:
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"Any person who is on

parole for a felony or is incarcerated at the Utah State Prison
shall not have in his possession or under his custody or control
any dangerous weapon as defined in this part."

Defendant does

not challenge his status as a felony parolee, nor does he claim
that the gun found under the seat in the passenger compartment of
McCoy's pickup truck is not a dangerous weapon.

Defendant claims

only that the evidence did not support a finding that the gun was
in defendant's possession or under defendant's custody or
control.
Contrary to defendant's contentions, defendant's
possession of the gun was established by more than just David
McCoy's testimony.

Officer Huish testified, and the police

report confirmed, that both David McCoy and Mike Perry informed
him that defendant was in possession of the gun CR. 117-118, 181187).

Of those present in the cab of McCoy's pickup truck on the

night of Tuesday, January 25, 1983, only defendant had had the
opportunity to steal Brian Hargett's gun after Hargett had
cleaned the gun on the afternoon of Sunday, January 23, 1983, CR.
63-68, 72-77, 80, 85-86, 129-130, 191, 194).

Finally, Officer

Huish found the gun under the seat directly below where defendant
had been sitting CR. 86, 96-97, 109-111, 121, 134-135).
Thus, the evidence was not so inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt.

To the contrary, the

evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun was
in defendant's possession.

Furthermore, because the conviction

is supported by more than McCoy's eyewitness testimony, the cases
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cited by defendant in his brief on this point are inopposite.
finally, the trial court had ample opportunity to assess the
c,edibility of the witnesses and whether their testimony was
tainted by any self-interest, so the conviction should not be
dist11rbed because of an allegation on appeal of tainted
testimony.

Therefore, the conviction should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State seeks aff irmance

of the conviction below.-;£
DATED this

,,2_f____ day of January,

1985.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

~~

EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of
the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Lisa J. Rema!, attorney
for appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 333 South
Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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APPENDIX A
A true and exact copy of pages 103, 140-146 of the
Record on Appeal (Transcript page numbers 90-97), covering the
portions of the trial transcript involving the exclusion of Mike
Perry's hearsay testimony, is attached hereto as Appendix "A".
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A

-

-----

--------------

I thought I was at one time, but apparently

was not.

Q

Then what happened after you seen the

individuals where you said?
A

After he

had pending, he says,

informed me of the warrants that I
"You're free to go now," okay?

And

at that time this -- I didn't know her last name, LaDawn,
I

will refer to her as LaDawn.

She was standing there

next to me and David McCoy Crawled out of the police
10

officer's car and came over and stood next to me.

11

I

kind of grabbed him by the elbow and pushe

12

him to the side and said,

13

You indicated to me that was not Dennis Heaps' gun."
MR. SOLTIS:

14

15

18

THE COURT:

21

(By Mr. Valdez)

A

Yes, I

Did you ask him any cuestions?
•
I

asked him whose it was.

MR. SOLTIS:

Now, who is this conversation

with, Counsel?
Q

A
)4

Be sustained.

Q

19

20

Well, I will object to this,

your Honor.

16
17

"Hey, what is going on here?

(By Mr. Valdez)

Who was the conversation

l':i th Mr. David 1'icCoy.
~hat

did he reply?

MP. SOLTIS:

I

will object, your Honor.

I

I
I

Mr. McCoy -THE COUPT:

2

3

present at the time?

4

whom?

Be sustained as to -- who

~a,

Was McCoy there of the defendant

5

Q.

(By Mr. Valdez)

6

A.

Mr. Heaps was escorted to the Salt Lake

County Jail.

Kho was present at the

At the time this conversation was taking

s

place, as I indicated, I grabbed him by the elbow and

9

pulled him to the side.

10

I

was talking to him,

and this man.

11

Q.

Nobody else was present?

12

A.

Oh, no.

13

0

Did you ask him whose gun it was?

14

A.

Yes, more or less indicated.
MR. SOLTIS:

15

Yes.

Same objection, your Honor.

(By Mr. Valdez)

Well, he replied;

16

Q.

17

correct?

18

A.

Yes, he did.

19

('

Did he say it was Mr. Heaps' gun?

20

A.

No, he did not.
THE COl:RT:

21

n

just me

is that

That will be stricken as a

violation of the hearsay rule.

O

23

(By Mr. Valdez)

Did he make any indicatle'

~

to vou as to whose oun it w2s, and that's a yes or no

2:;

answ·er.

k

Yes, he did.

~

May I ask the follow-up question to that,

your Honor, as to whether or not he indicated it was
Mr. Heaps' gun?

THE COUPT:
6 '

j

That's a yes or no question also.
You may not.

You can't do by

indirect examination what you can't do by direct examinati n.
Are you taking it as proof of the fact of whose gun it
was or what, sir?
MR. VALDEZ:

gun it was.

10

don't think this is going
THE COURT:

11
12

I

I

;:as.

I

I

As an indication as to whose

All right.

As to whose gun it

will not accept it for whose oun it was as beino a

,

-

I

13

hearsay statement.

14

will not accept it for the truth or falsity of the contents

15

thereof.

16

If you have some other reason.

Is this what the officer says?
MP. VALDEZ:

17

said to this individual.

11:

THE COURT:

1?

it you asked him?

20

MP.

21

23

~hat

This is what Mr. McCoy

But as -- what was

McCoy said to him?

~r.

THE COURT:

No.

All right.

VAT~DEZ:

Mr. McCoy said it was

22

I

I asked him whether or not
Heaps' gun to him.
~Ell,

I will not accept what

Mr. McCoy said as to the truth of falsity of the contents
thereof.

If you ha\'e some other reason for the question,

sir, you may proceed.
I

---~

----------------

-------

(By Mr. Valdez)

Did he make any -- well,

2

did he say to you why he said he told the police offi•.c•

3

it was Mr. Heaps' gun?

4

A.

MR. SOLTIS:

5
6

Yes, he did.
Well, it's the same otject1on,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

No.

He can answer yes or no,

B

whether he did or did not say so.

9

this, as to
MR. VALDEZ:

10
11

THE COURT:

MR. \'ALDEZ:

15

THE COURT:

17

18

Just the reasons as to why

To the police officer in his

presence?

14

16

Yes.
\·Jell, I will sustain the obiec:::

if that's the basis for the question.
Q.

(By Mr. Valdez)

Did he make any indicatior.

to you as to why he may have been scared?

19

A.

Yes, he did.

20

().

What were those?

21

MR. SOLTIS:

22

THE COURT:

Sarne objection, your Honor.
No.

23

can get his state of mind.

24

somebody else did or didn't do.

25

is the purpose o'.

Mr. McCoy would have said that it was Dennis Heaps' gun.

12
13

\olha t

Q.

(By

~·r.

P..s to why he "'·as scared,

It's not a relation to what

\'alrc2)

h"Lat

ciid he say about l "

being scared?
k

He said that really the reason why he said

what he said is because he was on probation and that he
would be violated if caught in the act of, I don't know,
5

I

in -- I can say that.

But the gun, because it was in his

vehicle, he was scared he was going to get violated on his
probation.
Q

And he told you that?

k

Yes, he did.

10

Q.

Did you have any further conversation with

11

him after that?

12

A.

Other than telling him that it was much

13

worse situation for Mr. Heaps because he was on parole,

14

J

didn't see where he would get off on the
MR. SOLTIS:

15 '

16

materiality of that, your Honor.
THE COGRT:

17

18

Well, objection to the

Well, I can disregard it,

Mr. Soltis.

10

Q.

(By Mr. \'aldez)

will withdraw the

Have you ever had any further conversations

2l'

question on that.

21

with Mr. McCoy?

22

A.

No, not prior to this time.

Q.

Did you }cno"'· at that tim€ "'·hose gun that

h.

J\ot for sure.

v.·cs?

I v:a s indicated to whose it

v.·a s.

94

!

1·1J

- - - - - - - - - --

2
3

Mr. McCoy did when he said there was a

THE COURT:

A.

Me, Mr. Heaps, this girl, LaDawn, and the

Q.

Okay.

And whose gun did he say at that

MR. SOLTIS:
THE WITNESS:
whose gun it was.

Same objection, your Honor.
At that time he didn't say

He said

MR. VALDEZ:
THE COURT:

Hold on until the judge rules.
Let's get another answer.

He

didn't say whose -THE WITNESS:
was.

He didn't say whose gun it

He just indicated there was -THE COCRT:

2S

t0E

it was?

19

24

Who was present at that

child, and Mr. McCoy.

17

23

Ask another question, please.

time?

16

22

Same objection,

(By Mr. Valdez)

14

20

All right.

Q.

13

18

I
01-..:~

your Honor.

11

15

--------r

-

A.

MR. SOLTIS:

9

12

..

in his vehicle.

7

10

-

Who made that indication to you?

6

8

---

Q.

4

5

--- -

Just a moment, sir.

was did he say whose gun it was.

The ooest1··

And you have answered

that c;uestion.
Q

.say it '-'as?

(By Mr. \'aldez)

Okay.

Whose gun did he

I

MR. SOLTIS:

I

THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

I object on hearsay, your Honor
That ,,;ill be sustained.
At what time?

(By Mr. Valdez)

0

Who was present when he tol

you whose gun he thought i t might be or gave an
I

indication as to whose gun i t was?

I

7

I

The indication came when we were in the

A.

vehicle and we asked him why he was paranoid.

Mr. Heaps

asked him why he was paranoid of the police officer.
10

That's the indication, because he says, "There's a gun in

11

this truck."

12

"There's a gun in this truck."

13

I don't know if he said, "I have a gun," or

Okay.

0

14

1S

But what I am asking you --

MR. SOLTIS:
your Honor.

IE

THE COURT:

17 I

MR. VALDEZ:

15
19

It has been asked and answered,

the question, your Honor.

It has.
I don't know if he understood
I

Maybe if I ask it in a

different way.
THE COURT:

If he will answer the questions

21

and stop volunteering and giving me -- if you listen to

22

Mr. Valdez, he's offering very good, to-the-point, concise

?3

questions.

1

Just answer his question and don't try to throw

in all this other stuff that I am
1n here.

I

that you want to get

Just answer Mr. Valdez' question simply and
I

__ _ll,_:
'\

to the point.
2
3

Q.

(By Mr. Valdez)

At any point in time was

the actual ownership of the gun indicated to you?

4

A.

Yes, it was.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

Me and Mr. McCoy.

Q

And who made that indication?

8

A.

Mr. McCoy did.

9

Q

Was anybody else present?

10

A.

No.

11

Q

Did he give you a name as to who the gun

12

And who was present at that time?

belor:ged to?
He didn't have to.

It was just me and him

13

A.

14

standing there.

15

Q.

And was that Mr. Heaps?

16

A.

No.
MR. SOLTIS:

17
18

20
21

\·Jell, again, it's hearsay,

I

I

I

your Honor.

I,

THE COURT:

19

....

You may ask another guestion, sir.

-:

Q.

I

Be sustained.
i-;ere you

(By Mr. Valdez)

arrested on that particular night then;

I

you were never
is that correct?

22

P•.

No, sir, I

23

Q.

Police allowed you to go then?

24

A.

Yes,

25

Q.

Who v..·a s arr€sted?

Wa8

I

I

not.

they did.

I
I
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